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Abstract: 
Results from two experiments revealed that prior experience with proactive interference (PI) 
diminished PI’s effects for both young and older adults. Participants were given two rounds of 
experience, with different materials, in a situation that produced PI. Comparisons with a control 
condition showed that the effects of PI on accuracy and on high-confidence intrusion errors 
(false memory) were reduced on the second round, as compared with those on the first. Also, the 
ability of confidence to diagnose accuracy of responding improved across rounds. Effects of 
prior experience with PI depended on feedback given at the time of test (Experiment 1). At least 
in part, the diminishment of PI resulted from participants’ allocating more attention to 
interference items during study in the second round than in the first (Experiment 2). Implications 
of the results for interpreting age differences in PI and false memory are discussed. 
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Article: 
Proactive interference (PI) refers to the reduction in memory performance for recently learned 
information resulting from the prior learning of related materials and has been shown to play an 
important role in forgetting (for a review, see Anderson & Neely, 1996). Investigations of PI 
have traditionally used a paired-associate learning procedure, in which interference is created by 
holding cues constant, with the responses being changed between two lists (A–B, A–D). 
Performance in this interference condition is compared with that in a control condition for which 
both cues and responses are changed between lists (A–B, C–D) or for which participants first 
“rest” and then learn cue–response pairs (rest, C–D). The magnitude of PI effects is indexed as 
the difference in cued-recall accuracy between the control and interference conditions on the 
final test. 
Errors resulting from PI can take the form of a first-list response intruding when participants are 
asked to produce the response paired with a cue in the second list. Older adults are more 
susceptible to such interference than are young adults because of their lessened ability to avoid 
making erroneous responses that have been made highly probable by prior experience (see, e.g., 
Hasher, Zacks, & May, 1999; Hay & Jacoby, 1999; May, Hasher, & Kane, 1999). Older adults 
are also more likely to produce intrusion errors that result from PI with high levels of confidence 
(for a review, see Dodson & Krueger, 2006; Jacoby, Bishara, Hessels, & Toth, 2005; Jacoby & 
Rhodes, 2006; Kelley & Sahakyan, 2003). Confidence in intrusion errors is important because 
older adults’ high confidence in such errors makes them vulnerable to memory slips and memory 
scams (Hay & Jacoby, 1999; Jacoby et al., 2005). An intrusion error is likely to be acted on only 
if it is held with a high level of confidence. For example, memory for taking a daily medicine 
yesterday might intrude as a high-confidence memory of having taken the medicine today, a 
false memory that results in failure to take the medicine today. 
The goal of our experiments was to determine whether PI could be reduced by providing 
participants with multiple experiences dealing with PI. Although the importance of PI effects is 
widely known, prior research has not examined whether people can adapt their processing in 
ways that allow them to avoid or, at least, diminish such effects. It is of interest to determine 
whether older (as well as younger) adults can do so. Older adults have been held to be deficient 
in inhibitory processes (e.g., Hasher et al., 1999), less likely to engage in deeper processing of 
the sort necessary for memory (e.g., Craik & Byrd, 1982), and less able to engage in recollection 
as a means of avoiding interference effects (e.g., Hay & Jacoby, 1999). Deficits of these sorts 
might result in older adults’ being less able to benefit from prior experience with PI than are 
young adults. 
Investigation of the effects of prior experience with interference on false memory has also been 
neglected. Although there have been many findings of false memory that originates from 
interference, it has not been determined whether such effects would persist across extended 
experience with the procedures used to produce them. We were particularly interested in 
determining whether older adults could learn to avoid false memories in the form of high-
confidence intrusion errors that result from interference effects. Success in decreasing older 
adults’ susceptibility to PI and in reducing false memories resulting from PI would increase 
understanding of the bases for PI, as well as of age-related differences in memory, and would 
potentially have import for applied purposes. 
To investigate effects of experience, we examined PI across a pair of lists (A–B, A–D for 
interference items), presented a pair of two new lists (E–F, E–G), and tested again for PI. The 
effects of multiple experiences dealing with PI were examined by comparing both accuracy and 
confidence on the second encounter with PI to results from the first encounter with PI. 
We employed a procedure that was introduced by Hay and Jacoby (1996). Specifically, the 
participants were first exposed to a list of semantically related word pairs (e.g., knee–bone), with 
each pair being presented three times. Following this training phase, the participants studied a list 
of word pairs. A third of the studied pairs (facilitation items) were identical to those presented 
during the training phase (e.g., knee–bone). For another third of the items (interference items), 
the right-hand member of a studied pair differed from that of a pair that had been presented 
during the training phase (e.g., knee–bend). These interference items were characterized by high 
levels of PI and are thus of primary interest. The remaining third of the studied pairs (control 
items) had not been presented during the training phase. Following the study phase, the 
participants were given a cued recall test and made a confidence judgment for each item. Test 
items consisted of a cue word and word fragment that could be completed with either the target 
or the alternate response that appeared during the training for interference items (e.g., knee–
b_n_). 
The test procedure of presenting a cue word along with a fragment of the response was meant to 
restrict responses to the target word and the alternate word that would serve to complete the 
fragment with an associatively related word. This was intended to increase PI and allow us to 
better examine effects of PI on intrusion errors. Including both facilitation and interference pairs 
within a list accords with experience outside the laboratory, in that one usually encounters cues 
requiring responses that are consistent with their prior responses intermixed with those for which 
prior experience serves as a source of PI. Inter-mixing facilitation and interference pairs was 
expected to increase PI. Also, including facilitation items discourages a strategy of generating 
both responses to a cue and then producing the less familiar one as a means of avoiding 
interference effects. Adopting that strategy might enhance performance on interference pairs but 
would reduce accuracy for facilitation pairs. 
In order to improve accuracy and reduce high-confidence intrusions, half of the participants were 
provided with feedback following each test trial (Experiment 1; cf. Rebok & Balcerak, 1989). 
The feedback was structured in a manner that depended on confidence judgments. Specifically, 
participants were instructed to treat each confidence judgment as a wager that they had correctly 
recalled the studied item. A running score was made visible on all trials. Participants were told 
that, for each correct answer reported, their point total would increase by a number equivalent to 
their confidence rating, whereas each incorrect answer would decrease their score by that same 
number. We expected that providing feedback in this way would serve to diminish the effects of 
interference and likewise reduce reported confidence when intrusions were produced. 
Participants were administered two rounds of the procedure, with different materials being used 
in each round, allowing a comparison of performance for the first versus second round of testing. 
Another group received the same procedure, with the exception that they did not receive 
feedback. Participants in the no-feedback condition were simply instructed to make confidence 
judgments without being told to treat those judgments as a wager. We expected the presence of 
feedback to be important, particularly for older adults. Older adults were expected to be more 
likely to produce high-confidence intrusion errors than were young adults and, therefore, to be 
more reliant on feedback to reveal their errors. 
As was anticipated, the results of Experiment 1 revealed that prior experience with PI did indeed 
diminish its effects for both older and young adults. Having had prior experience with PI, older 
adults were dramatically less likely to produce false memories in the form of high-confidence 
intrusion errors. 
We conducted Experiment 2 in order to gain insight into the means by which experience with PI 
allowed participants to diminish its effects. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Method 
Participants. Forty-eight young and 48 older adults were recruited from the Washington 
University Psychology Department subject pool. Participants in each age group were randomly 
assigned to the two feedback conditions (24 participants each). The mean age did not differ 
significantly between the feedback and no-feedback conditions for either older (74.58 vs. 75.58 
years) or young adults (19.92 vs. 19.13 years). Participants were tested individually and received 
course credit (young adults only) or $10 per hour. 
Design and Materials. A 2 (feedback: feedback vs. nofeedback) × 3 (item type: facilitation vs. 
control vs. interference) × 2 (round: 1 vs. 2) × age (young vs. older) mixed design was used. 
Item type and round were manipulated within subjects; feedback and age were between-subjects 
variables. Materials consisted of 156 three-word sets. Each set contained a cue word (e.g., knee) 
and two related responses (e.g., bone, bend). Groups were created such that, across items, the 
average length and strength of association of each response with the cue was equated. Both 
responses could complete the same word fragment (e.g., b_n_). Six groups of 24 sets served as 
critical items; the remaining sets served as buffers. Each group was balanced for frequency and 
length of cues and responses. The groups were counterbalanced across conditions, so that each 
occurred equally often in each of the within-subjects conditions. 
Item types were created by varying the relationship of the pairs in the training (List 1) and study 
(List 2) lists. For facilitation items, the cues and responses were the same in Lists 1 and 2. For 
the interference items, the cues were the same in both lists, but the responses changed from List 
1 to List 2 (e.g., knee–bone, knee–bend). Control items were only presented in the study list. Test 
items consisted of a cue word and word fragment that could be completed with either the target 
or an alternate response that appeared during training for interference items (e.g., knee–b_n_). 
On each round, List 1 consisted of 48 pairs presented three times each (144 total), and List 2 
consisted of 24 items from each of the three item types (72 total). Both lists were presented in 
random order. An additional three pairs were presented at the beginning and end of the study list 
to serve as primacy and recency buffers. Test lists contained 24 items of each type (72 total) and 
were presented in a fixed random order with the restriction that no more than three items from 
the same condition were presented consecutively. 
Procedure. The training phase (List 1) occurred first. The participants were told that they would 
see word pairs that would be repeatedly presented and that they were to read each pair aloud. 
Pairs were presented for 2 sec each, followed by a 1,000-msec interstimulus interval (ISI). After 
List 1 was completed, participants began the study phase (List 2). They were told that they would 
see word pairs that they would need to remember for a later memory test and were instructed to 
read each pair aloud. Each pair was presented for 2 sec, followed by a 1,000-msec ISI. 
At the time of test, participants were told that a cue paired with a word fragment would be 
presented (e.g., knee–b_n_). They were instructed to complete the fragment with the word that 
was paired with the cue word in the study phase. Participants were given 10 sec to provide a 
response aloud. Next, they were asked to provide a confidence rating on a scale from 1 (not very 
confident) to 5 (very confident) that the item had been studied in List 2. Participants were 
encouraged to use the full range of the scale. Four practice trials were given prior to test. All 
responses were recorded by the experimenter. 
For participants in the no-feedback condition, a new test item was presented, following each 
confidence rating. In contrast, participants in the feedback condition were given corrective 
feedback following each item in both rounds of the experiment. Participants given feedback were 
told to treat their confidence rating as a wager based on the likelihood that their answer was 
correct. Participants gained or lost points equal to their confidence rating for correct and 
incorrect responses, respectively. A message regarding the accuracy of each response was 
displayed following the confidence rating, and points were added or deducted from a running 
tally. Participants were encouraged to earn as many points as possible. After the first round, 
participants in the feedback condition were shown their cumulative score for that round. Both 
groups completed the entire procedure a second time with a new set of items. 
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary inspection of the results revealed that the probability of correctly responding to 
items in the facilitation condition was near ceiling, so we analyzed the results from that condition 
separately from performance in other conditions. Our primary interest was in whether prior 
experience with PI would diminish its effects, particularly for false memory (intrusion errors at 
the highest level of confidence). 
Diminishing effects of PI were evidenced by a significant interaction between rounds (first vs. 
second encounter with PI) and item type (control vs. interference) in the probability of intrusion 
errors. Having found an interaction of that sort, we analyzed effects separately for control and 
interference items. The probability of producing either the target or its alternate was extremely 
high for facilitation (.97), control (.92), and interference items (.97), so errors other than 
producing an alternate response as an intrusion error did not enter into the analyses. We do not 
report significant main effects of variables when an interaction involving the variables was 
significant. The significance level for all tests was set at p < .05. 
An analysis of the number of correct responses in the facilitation condition revealed only a 
significant effect of age [F(1,92) = 12.85, MSe = .17, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .12]. The probability of producing a 
correct response for facilitation pairs was higher for young adults (.93) than for older adults 
(.87). An additional analysis of performance in the facilitation condition examined effects on the 
joint probability of producing a correct response and reporting the highest level of confidence (5) 
in its accuracy. Analysis of those results (Table 1) revealed only a significant effect of feedback 
[F(1,92) = 6.14, MSe = .41, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .06]. Providing feedback increased highest confidence, accurate 
responding for both young and older adults. Neither the main effect of round nor any other main 
effect or interaction approached significance. The lack of a significant effect of round on 
responding to facilitation items is important in that it suggests that participants did not reduce 
their attention to the training list in the second round as a means of reducing PI. Had they done 
so, one would expect to find a reduction in high-confidence, accurate responding in the 
facilitation condition across rounds. More important, the results reveal the importance of 
feedback for increasing confidence in correct responses. As will be seen, feedback was also 
important for reducing confidence in erroneous responses. 
Prior experience with PI diminished its effects on intrusion errors, as evidenced by a highly 
significant interaction of item type (control vs. interference) and round [F(1,92) = 9.46, MSe = 
.09, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .10]. The results from a separate analysis of performance in the control condition 
revealed only a significant interaction of age and feedback [F(1,92) = 7.10, MSe = .08, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .07]. 
This interaction was produced by the age difference in the probability of an intrusion error being 
smaller in the feedback condition (.15 and .20 for young vs. older adults, respectively) than in the 
no-feedback condition (.12 and .25 for young vs. older adults, respectively). Neither the effect of 
round nor any interaction with round approached significance in the analysis of performance on 
control items. 
Table 1. Probability of Correct Recall (PCR) Held in Highest Confidence for Facilitation Items 
As a Function of Round, Feedback, and Age 
 Young Older 
 Feedback No Feedback Feedback No Feedback 
 PCR SEM PCR SEM PCR SEM PCR SEM 
Experiment 1 
Round 1 .67 .04 .62 .04 .72 .04 .62 .04 
Round 2 .69 .04 .55 .04 .71 .04 .62 .04 
Experiment 2 
Round 1 .55 .05 - .61 .05  -  
Round 2 .58 .06 - .57 .06  -  
 
Table 2. Probability of List 1 Intrusions (PLI) on Interference Items As a Function of Age, 
Round, and Feedback 
 Young Older 
 Feedback No Feedback Feedback No Feedback 
 PCR SEM PCR SEM PCR SEM PCR SEM 
Experiment 1 
Round 1 .33 .03 .34 .02 .54 .03 .55 .03 
Round 2 .27 .03 .26 .03 .43 .03 .51 .03 
Experiment 2 
Round 1 .29 .04 - .39 .04  -  
Round 2 .20 .03 - .27 .03  -  
 
Our primary interest was in intrusion errors in the interference condition (Table 2). Older adults 
produced more intrusion errors on interference items (.51) than did young adults (.30) [F(1,92) = 
60.88, MSe = 2.09, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .40]. In contrast to results for the control condition, the effect of round 
was highly significant for the interference condition [F(1,92) = 20.86, MSe = .24, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .19], with 
the probability of an intrusion error being lower in the second round (.37) than in the first round 
(.44). Inspection of the results in Table 2 suggests that, for older adults, the effect of prior 
experience with PI did more to diminish its effects in the feedback condition than in the no-
feedback condition. However, the relevant interaction did not approach significance. 
The effects of prior experience on false-memory errors were of particular interest because people 
are likely to act on such errors. False-memory errors are measured as the joint probability of 
producing an intrusion error and holding the highest level of confidence (5) in the accuracy of 
the erroneous response. For purposes of comparison, errors held at the highest level of 
confidence were analyzed for control pairs. Responding to the cue from a control pair with the 
alternate to the target (the response that, for an interference pair, was presented in List 1 and 
served as a source of PI) was counted as an intrusion error. The interaction of type of pair 
(control vs. interference) with round was highly significant [F(1,92) = 24.35, MSe = .10, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = 
.21]. 
A separate analysis of performance on control pairs revealed that high-confidence intrusions 
were rare because the alternate response had not been presented in List 1 but occurred with a 
higher probability for older adults (.056) than for young adults (.012) [F(1,92) = 20.94, MSe = 
.09, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .19]. The reduction from Round 1 (.038) to Round 2 (.030) in the probability of a 
highest confidence intrusion error to control pairs was exceedingly small but approached 
significance [F(1,92) = 3.36, MSe = .003, p =.07, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .04]. The effect of prior experience on 
false-memory errors for interference pairs was much larger. 
An analysis of false-memory errors for interference pairs (Table 3) revealed that older adults 
were much more likely to make such errors than were young adults [F(1,92) = 95.15, MSe = 
2.46, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .51] and also revealed a large decrease in the probability of false- memory errors 
across rounds [F(1,92) = 32.47, MSe = .24, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .26]. The triple interaction of round, feedback, 
and age approached significance [F(1,92) = 3.76, MSe = .03, p = .056, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .04]. Further 
analyses examined results separately for young and older adults. The analysis of results for 
young adults showed that they were more likely to produce false-memory errors when feedback 
was provided [F(1,46) = 7.92, MSe = .07, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .15]. More important, the round × feedback 
interaction was significant for older adults [F(1,46) = 4.88, MSe = .06, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .10] but did not 
approach significance for young adults (F < 1). As is shown in Table 3, for older adults, the 
decrease in false-memory errors across rounds occurred only in the condition that received 
feedback, whereas the provision of feedback was unimportant for the effect of round on the 
performance of young adults. 
The decrease in the probability of high-confidence intrusion errors across rounds might reflect an 
overall improvement in the ability to use confidence judgments to discriminate between correct 
responses and errors. Additional analyses examined the extent to which confidence judgments 
differed between correct recalls and errors, separately for control and interference items. For 
control items, young adults were more confident in their correct recall of target items (4.05) than 
in their errors (2.40), as were older adults (4.14 vs. 3.09). However, the difference in confidence 
between correct recalls and errors was greater for young adults than for older adults [F(1,86) = 
17.94, MSe = 8.29, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .17], largely because of older adults’ greater confidence in their errors. 
Confidence in responses was higher in the first round (3.49) than in the second round (3.34) 
[F(1,86) = 7.62, MSe = 2.04, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .08], but the interaction of round with confidence in correct 
recalls versus errors did not approach significance (F < 1). That is, the effects of prior experience 
did not increase the usefulness of confidence judgments for discriminating between correct recall 
and errors on control items. 
Table 3. Probability of List 1 Intrusions (PLI) Held at the Highest Level of Confidence (False 
Memories) As a Function of Age, Round, and Feedback 
 Young Older 
 Feedback No Feedback Feedback No Feedback 
 PCR SEM PCR SEM PCR SEM PCR SEM 
Experiment 1 
Round 1 .15 .03 .10 .03 .36 .03 .35 .03 
Round 2 .09 .03 .03 .03 .24 .03 .32 .03 
Experiment 2 
Round 1 .08 .03 -  .20 .03 -  
Round 2 .03 .02 -  .11 .02 -  
 
Table 4. Confidence Ratings for Correct Recalls and Intrusion Errors on Interference Items As a 
Function of Age, Round, and Feedback 
 Feedback No Feedback 
 Young Older Young Older 



































































.84 .03 .69 .04 .82 .03 .74 .04 - - - - - - - - 
Round 
2 
.86 .03 .54 .05 .81 .03 .67 .04 - - - - - - - - 
 
Not surprising, confidence judgments for interference items (Table 4) discriminated less well 
between correct recalls (4.29) and intrusion errors (3.82) than did confidence judgments for 
control items (4.08 vs. 2.76) [F(1,82) = 126.58, MSe = 31.20, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .61]. As was found for control 
items, older adults’ confidence judgments for interference items discriminated less well between 
correct recalls and errors than did those of young adults [F(1,86) = 53.15, MSe = 13.58, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = 
.38]. More important, for interference items, prior experience with PI improved the usefulness of 
confidence judgments for distinguishing between correct recalls and errors, but only when 
feedback was given. The interaction of confidence in correct recall vs. intrusion errors with 
round and feedback for performance on interference items was significant [F(1,86) = 6.81, MSe = 
1.66, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .07]. An analysis of performance in the feedback condition revealed that the 
difference between confidence in correct recalls and intrusion errors was greater in the second 
round than in the first round, due to a reduction in confidence for intrusion errors [F(1,42) = 
11.24, MSe = 2.69, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .21]. For the no-feedback condition, in contrast, the corresponding 
interaction did not approach significance (F < 1). Rather, round only had the effect of equally 
reducing confidence in correct recalls and intrusion errors [F(1,44) = 4.27, MSe = .92, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .09]. 
In sum, the results revealed that prior experience with PI diminished its effects for both young 
and older adults. For older adults, there was a tendency toward the reduction in intrusion errors 
being larger when feedback was provided. The probability of false-memory intrusion errors held 
with the highest level of confidence was greater for older than for young adults and was reduced 
by prior experience with PI. However, for older adults, this reduction in false memory occurred 
only when feedback was given. For both young and older adults, prior experience with PI 
increased the ability of confidence judgments to distinguish between correct recalls and intrusion 
errors in the interference condition, but only when feedback was given. 
It might be argued that the reduced PI on the second round occurred because participants paid 
less attention to the list that served as a source of interference on the second round as compared 
with on the first round. Against that possibility, reduced attention to the first list would be 
expected to reduce performance on facilitation items as well as reducing interference. An effect 
of round was not found for facilitation items, even when performance was examined for correct 
responses given with highest confidence, which were far from a ceiling level of performance. 
Furthermore, for older adults, a reduction in intrusion errors produced at the highest level of 
confidence occurred only when feedback was given. Also, the effects of prior experience with PI 
on the ability of confidence judgments to distinguish between correct recalls and intrusions was 
restricted to interference items and occurred only when feedback was given. The specificity of 
these effects argues against the possibility that the diminishment in PI resulted from a general 
reduction in attention to the list that served as the source of PI. Experiment 2 provides evidence 
that allows further specification of how experience with PI serves to diminish its effects. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
In Experiment 2, we sought to replicate the finding that prior experience with PI diminishes its 
effects. Given the importance of feedback found in Experiment 1, all of the participants received 
feedback in Experiment 2. In contrast to Experiment 1’s design, the participants in Experiment 2 
were informed about the makeup of the study list, being told that the list would include 
interference and facilitation pairs as well as control pairs. Despite their having been warned 
about the presence of interference pairs, we did not expect participants to be aware of the greater 
difficulty of such pairs until Round 2, after prior experience with PI. 
Having become aware of the difficulties that interference pairs produce for later memory 
performance as a result of a prior encounter with PI, participants might pay special attention to 
interference pairs during study in the second round, so as to diminish the effects of PI. We 
examined this possibility by employing a self-allocated study-time procedure. Prior research has 
shown that learners generally allocate more study time to difficult items than to easy items when 
there are no time constraints on the study episode (for a review, see Son & Metcalfe, 2000). Item 
difficulty has typically been manipulated by varying the strength of association between a cue 
and its response, whereas our interest was in differences in difficulty produced by interference 
effects. Study time served as an index of the extent to which participants monitored item 
difficulty across item types (see, e.g., Koriat, Ma’ayan, & Nussinson, 2006). We expected that 
study time would not differ for the interference and control conditions in the first round. 
However, in the second round, as a result of feedback in the first round, participants were 
expected to monitor their study in ways that revealed interference pairs as being more difficult 
than control pairs and, therefore, to devote more study time to interference pairs. Greater 
attention to interference pairs during study might serve to better support later memory 
performance in ways that diminish the effects of PI. 
Experiment 2 was also designed to determine whether effects of prior experience with PI on 
confidence judgments would affect participants’ ability to withhold intrusion errors by not 
responding when given the opportunity to do so. After being forced to respond to each test item, 
participants gave a confidence judgment and were then given the option to volunteer or withhold 
their response (cf. Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). This option provided an opportunity for 
participants to withhold incorrect responses to interference items and further diminish, or even 
eliminate, PI effects. For volunteered responses, participants were awarded 5 points for correct 
responses and penalized 15 points for incorrect responses. For responses that were withheld, no 
feedback was given, and points were neither awarded nor penalized. We expected that the option 
to withhold responses would allow participants to further diminish the effects of PI, particularly 
in Round 2. 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 24 young adults (mean age = 20.25 years) and 24 older adults 
(mean age = 74.50 years) recruited from the Washington University Psychology Department 
subject pool. Participants were tested individually and received course credit (young adults only) 
or $10 per hour. 
Design and Materials. The design and materials in Experiment 2 were identical to those in 
Experiment 1, but with the exceptions described below. A 2 (age: young vs. older) × 3 (pair 
type: facilitation vs. control vs. interference) × 2 (round: 1 vs. 2) mixed design was used. Age 
was a between-subjects factor, and pair type and round were manipulated within subjects. The 
number of pairs was reduced to shorten the length of the experiment in order to accommodate the 
procedural changes. Materials consisted of 132 word triples. Six sets of 20 triples were rotated 
through conditions, with the remaining triples being used as buffers. Training lists comprised 20 
pairs of each type. Buffers were used for practice tests that preceded the actual tests in each 
round. 
Procedure. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1, but with the following exceptions. 
The training phase (List 1) in each round included fewer pairs (40 critical, 4 buffers = 132 total 
presentations). Prior to the study phase, the participants were informed about the nature of the 
study pairs in relation to those presented in the training phase. They were told to study each pair 
until it had been learned completely and to click on a box labeled “Next” displayed below each 
pair in order to move on, once they had finished studying. All ISIs were set to 500 msec. At the 
time of test, the participants were given cue–fragment pairs in the same manner as in Experiment 
1 (e.g., knee–b_n_) and were instructed to complete the fragment with the response presented in 
the study phase. The participants were then asked to rate their confidence, on a scale from 0 
(wild guess) to 100 (certain correct), that their response matched what they had studied. The 
participants were encouraged to use the full range of the scale. 
Following their confidence judgments, the participants were given the option to report or 
withhold their responses. For reported responses, they were awarded 5 points for each correct 
response and penalized 15 points for each incorrect response. No points were gained or lost for 
withheld responses. Participants were encouraged to maximize their point total by reporting only 
responses for which they were sufficiently confident of being correct. A running score was 
displayed in the upper right-hand corner of the screen. Corrective feedback was not provided for 
withheld responses. 
Results and Discussion 
We begin by reporting the results that replicate those found in Experiment 1. Next, we examine 
the effects of prior experience with PI on the ability to withhold intrusion errors so as to increase 
the accuracy of responding. Finally, we report effects on the allocation of study time to show that 
participants increase the amount of study time devoted to interference pairs following prior 
experience with PI. As in Experiment 1, the probability of producing either the target or its 
alternate was extremely high for facilitation (.98), control (.96), and interference items (.97), so 
errors other than producing an alternate response did not enter into the analyses. 
Analysis of performance in the facilitation condition did not yield any significant effects. 
Performance was near ceiling for both young (.93) and older adults (.91). An additional analysis 
of performance in the facilitation condition examined effects on the joint probability of 
producing a correct response and reporting the highest level of confidence in its accuracy (Table 
1, bottom rows). That analysis did not reveal any significant effects. As in Experiment 1, round 
did not influence responding on facilitation items, suggesting that attention to List 1 was not 
reduced across rounds. This is important for dismissing the possibility that diminished effects of 
PI across rounds result from reduced attention to List 1, the source of PI. A reduction in attention 
of that sort would be expected to reduce performance on facilitation pairs, as well as to reduce 
interference for interference pairs. 
More important, the analysis of intrusion errors in the control and interference conditions 
revealed a significant interaction between item type (control vs. interference) and round [F(1,46) 
= 8.17, MSe = .08, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .15], showing that prior experience with PI diminished its effects. For 
items in the control condition, only the effect of age was significant [F(1,46) = 5.49, MSe = .06, 
𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .11]. The probability of an intrusion error on control items was higher for older adults (.13) 
than for young adults (.08). Neither the effect of round nor any interaction with round 
approached significance. 
Performance on interference items was of greater interest (Table 2, bottom row). Fewer intrusion 
errors were produced for interference items in the second round than in the first [F(1,46) = 20.04, 
MSe = .28, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .30]. Also, young adults produced fewer intrusion errors than did older adults 
[F(1,46) = 4.78, MSe = .19, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .09]. 
As in Experiment 1, our primary interest was in whether experience with PI would reduce the 
probability of false memory, defined as an intrusion error accompanied by 100% confidence. 
False memory was significantly reduced by prior experience, as evidenced by a highly 
significant interaction between round and item type (control vs. interference) [F(1,46) = 14.75, 
MSe = .04, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .24]. An analysis of performance on control items revealed that the probability 
of highest confidence errors was greater for older adults (.029) than for young adults (.001) 
[F(1,46) = 10.54, MSe = .02, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .19]. The effect of round was also significant, although the 
probability of highest confidence errors for control pairs differed little between the first and 
second rounds (.022 vs. .008) [F(1,46) = 5.59, MSe = .004, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 � .11]. As is shown in the bottom 
row of Table 3, the probability of false memory for interference pairs was much higher for older 
(.15) than for young adults (.06) [F(1,46) = 10.34, MSe = .24, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .18]. Also, for interference 
pairs, the probability of false memory was greatly reduced on the second round (.07), as 
compared with the first round (.14) for both young and older adults [F(1,46) = 28.34, MSe = .13, 
𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .38]. A further analysis of confidence judgments examined their ability to distinguish 
between correct recall of target items and intrusion errors. An analysis of confidence judgments 
for responses to control items revealed only that participants’ confidence in their correct recalls 
(.72) was higher than that in their intrusion errors (.42) [F(1,25) = 61.29, MSe = 2.42, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .71]. 
Neither the effect of age nor that of round approached significance (Fs < 1). In contrast, an 
analysis of confidence judgments for responses to interference items (Table 4, bottom row) 
showed that experience with PI increased the ability of confidence judgments to distinguish 
between correct recalls and intrusion errors for both young and older adults, as evidenced by a 
significant interaction between response (correct recall vs. intrusion error) and round [F(1,43) = 
9.59, MSe = .13, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .18]. However, older adults’ confidence judgments for interference items 
discriminated less well between correct recall and intrusion errors than did those of young adults 
[F(1,43) = 7.11, MSe = .19, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .14], largely because of the older adults’ higher confidence in 
their intrusion errors. 
When given the opportunity to withhold responses, the probability of a response being withheld, 
regardless of whether or not it was correct, was lower for facilitation items (.11) than for either 
control (.22) or interference items (.16) [F(2,92) = 30.02, MSe = .28, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .40]. An analysis that 
included only control and interference items revealed a significant interaction between age and 
item type [F(1,46) = 4.93, MSe = .05, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .10]. Young adults differed little from older adults in 
their probability of withholding a response to an interference item (.16 vs. .17) but were much 
less likely to withhold a response to a control item (.18) than were older adults (.25).  
Did prior experience with PI increase the probability of withholding intrusion errors to 
interference items? It did so for young adults, but not for older adults, as evidenced by a 
significant interaction of age and round [F(1,43) = 5.93, MSe = .35, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .12]. For young adults, 
the probability of withholding an intrusion error for interference items was higher on the second 
round (.46) than on the first round (.22). In contrast, the probability of older adults withholding 
an intrusion error to interference items was identical on the two rounds (.21). 
As compared with forced report, allowing participants to withhold responses (free report) 
increased the accuracy of recall in the control and interference conditions, and there was a 
tendency toward this increase being larger for young adults than for older adults [F(1,46) = 3.64, 
MSe = .01, p = .063, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .07]. Across conditions, the probability of an error was higher for 
young adults when recall was forced rather than free (.16 vs. .12), whereas the corresponding 
difference for older adults was somewhat smaller (.23 vs. .21). The pattern was the same when 
the results were analyzed separately for interference items. The probability of an intrusion error 
for young adults was higher when recall was forced rather than when it was free (.24 vs. .20), 
and there was a tendency toward that difference being smaller for older adults (.33 vs. .32), but 
the interaction only approached significance [F(1,46) = 3.10, MSe = .01, p = .09, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .06]. No 
other interactions involving report option, including the interaction with round, approached 
significance. 
As in Experiment 1, prior experience with PI diminished its effects. Examination of participants’ 
allocation of study time is revealing, with regard to the basis for this increased resistance to PI. 
As is shown in Table 5, participants spent less time studying facilitation pairs than they did either 
control or interference pairs, and the amount of study time devoted to facilitation pairs decreased 
across rounds. More important, the interaction of round with item type (control vs. interference) 
was significant [F(2,92) = 6.95, MSe = 2,845,578.22, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .13]. The significant interaction arose 
from study time allocated to control items decreasing across rounds, whereas study time 
allocated to interference items increased across rounds [F(1,46) = 7.72, MSe = 1,922,400.75, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 
= .15]. There was also a tendency for older adults to devote more study time to items in all 
conditions than did young adults (5,482 vs. 5,081 msec), but, because of the high variability of 
study time, neither that difference nor any interaction with age approached significance (Fs < 1). 
The differential effects of round suggest that both young and older adults became aware of the 
greater difficulty of interference items, so they increased the amount of study time devoted to 
those items in the second round. It is likely that their doing so was at least partially responsible 
for the diminished effects of PI. 
Table 5. Study-Time Allocation (in Milliseconds) As a Function of Round, Item Type, and Age 
Group in Experiment 2 
 Item Type 
 Facilitation Control Interference 
 M SEM M SEM M SEM 
Young Adults 
Round 1 4844 792 5606 882 5454 757 
Round 2 3985 402 5078 706 5522 631 
Older Adults 
Round 1 4939 509 5543 588 5796 627 
Round 2 4824 550 5667 638 6124 632 
Note — Observations exceeding 2.5 SDs above or below the mean in each within-participants 
condition were trimmed prior to analysis. Less than 2% of all observations were excluded. 
To measure the relation between self-allocated study time and accuracy of responding, gamma 
correlations between study time and accuracy were computed for each participant (see Nelson, 
1984) and then analyzed by means of an ANOVA. The analysis of those correlations revealed 
only a marginally significant effect of item type [F(2,38) = 2.78, MSe = .43, p = .07, 𝜂𝜂𝑝𝑝2 = .13]. 
There was an inverse correlation between study time and accuracy for facilitation pairs (-.14), 
whereas the correlation was not significant and slightly positive for control (.05) and interference 
(.04) pairs. The overall correlation was near zero. The inverse correlation for facilitation pairs 
suggests that participants were able to identify pairs that would be easily recalled and devoted 
little study time to those pairs. 
The generally low correlation between study time and accuracy might be surprising. Instead, one 
might expect a positive correlation between study time and accuracy because experimenter-
controlled increases in study time typically increase accuracy. However, the lack of correlation is 
not surprising if one realizes that, ideally, the amount of study time devoted to an item should 
depend on its difficulty, with study time devoted to an item’s being greater the higher its judged 
difficulty for recall. Allocating study time in this way would reduce the correlation between 
study time and accuracy and produce a zero correlation if there were differences in item 
difficulty and participants were sufficiently able to recognize and overcome those item 
differences by means of their allocation of study time (Koriat et al., 2006; cf. Nelson & 
Leonesio, 1988). Due to the complexities created by item differences, along with the possibility 
of qualitative changes in study, it would be difficult to detect changes in the relation between 
study time and accuracy across rounds. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Experience with PI diminishes its effects. Both experiments revealed a significant interaction 
with round, such that intrusion errors to interference items decreased across rounds, whereas 
performance on control items remained unchanged. Older adults were generally more reliant on 
feedback than were young adults, which is not surprising, since older adults were much more 
prone to produce high-confidence intrusion errors. There was a trend toward the reduction in 
intrusion errors for older adults’ being larger in Experiment 1 when feedback was provided, and 
older adults’ reduction in false memory—defined as intrusion errors held at the level of highest 
confidence—was observed only when feedback was provided. 
For both young and older adults, the increase across rounds in the extent to which confidence 
judgments were diagnostic of correct responding occurred only when feedback was provided. 
Feedback was provided for all conditions in Experiment 2, and results from that experiment 
replicated those of Experiment 1 by showing a decrease in false memory as a result of prior 
experience with PI, along with an increase in the extent to which confidence judgments were 
diagnostic of correct responding. The decrease in false memory gained from prior experience 
with PI was substantial. For older adults, the probability of false memory was almost halved 
from the first round to the second round (.20 vs. .11) in Experiment 2. 
When given the option to withhold responses in Experiment 2, young adults were more likely to 
withhold false recalls on the second round than on the first round; older adults were not. Neither 
young nor older adults substantially increased the accuracy of their responding under conditions 
of free, as compared with forced, responding. In contrast, Kelley and Sahakyan (2003) found that 
both young and older adults were able to greatly increase their accuracy under conditions of free 
responding. There are a number of differences between our experiments and theirs. Most 
important, perhaps, are the payoffs for correct and false recall that were employed. We awarded 
5 points for each correct response that was volunteered, and we penalized by subtracting 15 
points for each error that was volunteered, whereas Kelley and Sahakyan awarded 25 cents for 
each correct response and penalized $2.50 for each incorrect response. Perhaps our awards and 
penalties were simply not extreme enough to result in participants’ imposing a criterion for 
volunteering responses that would substantially increase their accuracy of responding. In this 
vein, confidence judgments, particularly for young adults, appeared to be sufficiently diagnostic 
of correct responding on the second round to allow them to greatly increase their accuracy by 
withholding responses if they had adopted a more stringent criterion for responding. 
We believe that our experiments are the first to show that experience with PI can diminish its 
effects— including false memory. We find it striking that minimal training can have a substantial 
impact. Much of the work on memory accuracy and aging has primarily drawn conclusions from 
a single session of performance. The data from the present study suggest that, if older adults are 
given feedback (cf. Balota, Duchek, Sergent-Marshall, & Roediger, 2006; Rebok & Balcerak, 
1989) and another opportunity to be tested, they can demonstrate improvements in performance. 
The implications of this are important in showing that older adults’ accuracy and confidence are 
both open to remediation and in providing further evidence that older adults’ susceptibility to 
false memories can be ameliorated (cf. McCabe & Smith, 2002). It is important that the 
probability of false memory that originates from PI can be reduced, because PI is a common 
source of false memories. 
How did experience with PI reduce false memory? One might suggest that reductions in 
confidence for intrusion errors to interference items occurred because participants became more 
risk averse as a consequence of high-confidence errors. A risk-aversion hypothesis would posit a 
generalized reduction in confidence, with participants reducing their confidence for all items 
across rounds. However, confidence for correct responses to facilitation pairs did not decrease 
across rounds. Also, the extent to which differences in confidence judgments were diagnostic of 
the accuracy of responses did not change across rounds for control items. Rather, those effects of 
prior experience with PI were selective to interference items. Thus, a risk-aversion hypothesis 
would have to rather implausibly assume that participants became more conservative on only a 
subset of the items (i.e., interference items) presented randomly throughout the test. Furthermore, 
the risk- aversion hypothesis would not account for the overall reduction in intrusion errors 
across rounds that was observed when responding was forced, as it was in Experiment 1 and in 
the forced-recall condition of Experiment 2. Yet another account would hold that the reduction 
of PI across rounds resulted from reduced attention to the training list, which served as a source 
of PI, on the second round. As discussed in conjunction with Experiment 1, the specificity of 
effects of prior experience on PI weighs against that account. 
Effects of prior experience with PI on the self-allocation of study time observed in Experiment 2 
suggest that prior experience with PI resulted in a change in the encoding of interference items 
across rounds. Although informed of the relationship between lists, participants were apparently 
unaware of the greater difficulty of interference items until after they had experienced PI. 
In a similar vein, Benjamin (2003) showed that participants gave higher judgments of learning 
for recognition of high- than of low-frequency words in an initial study session, predicting a 
pattern of performance that was opposite to that observed. However, after experience with a 
recognition test in the first session, participants correctly predicted that their recognition-memory 
performance would be better for low-frequency words in a second session. 
For PI, awareness of the greater difficulty of interference items resulted in the amount of study 
time devoted to interference pairs increasing across rounds, with the result that substantially 
more study time was devoted to interference pairs than to control pairs on the second round. 
Furthermore, there may have been both qualitative and quantitative differences in encoding 
processes across rounds that were selective to interference pairs. As a result of prior experience 
with PI, participants may have adapted their encoding of interference pairs in ways that provided 
greater support for later recollection. Similarly, participants in Experiment 1 may have devoted 
more attention to interference pairs in the second round and adapted their encoding processes to 
better deal with PI, although they were unable to devote more time to studying those pairs. 
Participants’ responding on the first round may have relied heavily on a fluency heuristic (Jacoby 
et al., 2005; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981), reporting items that came to mind most easily. This would 
be reasonable for facilitation items, but it would also have the consequence of leading 
participants to report the most accessible and, therefore, incorrect answer for interference items. 
However, having gained experience with PI, participants may have modified their encoding of 
interference pairs in ways that made them better able to shift from heavy reliance on fluency to 
other, more diagnostic bases for memory, such as reinstating prior encoding context to recollect 
prior details from study. Thus, the basis for participants’ confidence in their responses may have 
undergone a qualitative shift from a heavy reliance on judged fluency in the first round to greater 
reliance on recollection in the second round, resulting in increased accuracy and a reduction in 
confidence for errors. That is, the diminished effects of PI can be seen as reflecting a qualitative 
shift toward greater reliance on recollection as a basis for memory and confidence. 
It is noteworthy that older adults were as able as young adults to diminish effects of PI as a result 
of prior experience with PI. Experiments by Hay and Jacoby (1999) and by Jacoby, Debner, and 
Hay (2001) used a process-dissociation procedure to show that older adults’ greater vulnerability 
to PI resulted from their lessened ability to recollect the occurrence of particular events. Hay and 
Jacoby (1999) showed that, given supportive conditions, older adults were able to benefit from 
distinctive contextual information as a means of enhancing recollection. Results from the present 
experiments suggest that older adults’ ability to recollect can also be enhanced by means of 
training aimed at diminishing the effects of PI. The possibility that older adults’ ability to 
recollect particular events was improved by training to diminish the effects of PI is consistent 
with results from other experiments (e.g., Jennings & Jacoby, 2003; Jennings, Webster, 
Kleykamp, & Dagenbach, 2005) that have enhanced older adults’ ability to recollect by training 
under conditions of high interference. In general, training under conditions of high interference 
holds promise as a means of improving ability to recollect, thereby reducing false memory. 
Given the results of our experiments, it may be useful to revisit procedures that have been shown 
to produce dramatic false remembering (for reviews, see Loftus, 2004; Roediger, 1996). Many of 
the studies on false memory have drawn conclusions from a single session of performance. The 
dramatic levels of false memory found in those studies might not have persisted across repeated 
applications of the procedures used to produce them. As in the case of PI, the effectiveness of the 
procedure might diminish as a function of prior experience. For example, it might be more 
difficult to mislead people to falsely remember having been lost in a mall if they have had prior 
experience being misled in a similar way (cf. Loftus, 1997). 
The results of our present experiments suggest that being forewarned of a manipulation that 
could produce false memory may not be sufficient to avoid its effects. Being told that the study 
list included interference pairs did not diminish the effects of PI, but prior experience with PI 
did. More generally, prior experience in situations that produce false memory might diminish the 
likelihood of false memory in similar situations. Being forewarned and experienced might allow 
one to be forearmed against such effects. 
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